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Abstract. The European sovereign debt crisis has impaired many European 
banks. The distress on the European banks may transmit worldwide, and result 
in a large-scale knock-on default of financial institutions. This study presents a 
computer simulation model to analyze the risk of insolvency of banks and the 
consequent knock-on defaults in a bank credit network. Simulation experiments 
quantify the worst impact which is imposed on the number of bank defaults by 
heterogeneity of the bank credit network, the equity capital ratio of banks, and 
the capital surcharge on big banks.  
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1  Introduction 
The European sovereign debt crisis has impaired many European banks. European 
Banking Authority made a warning announcement that European banks are short of 
equity capital summing up to EUR 114.7 billion, and presented a recapitalization 
plan1 on December 18, 2011. The financial distress on some European banks may 
transmit to banks across country borders, and causes a knock-on default of banks and 
financial institutions worldwide. Indeed, many globally operating financial 
institutions like Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and American International Group 
ended in bankruptcy in the financial crisis which ensued from the collapse of the 
subprime mortgage market in 2007. Since then, supervisors and other relevant 
authorities have directed a great effort at comprehending the risk which is hidden 
behind globally interlinked financial institutions and at finding the solution to contain 
the catastrophic worldwide transmission of distress. 
For these purposes, computer simulation models [2] have been developed to 
understand the contagion in financial stability [5], and financial fragility [6]. The 
works of particular interest are the studies on the number of bank defaults in a knock-
on default [10], systemic risk [1], and the impact that the impairment of a bank 
                                                           
1 A. Enria, Results of bank recapitalization plan, 
http://eba.europa.eu/capitalexercise/2011/2011-EU-Capital-Exercise.aspx. 
imposes on the balance sheet of the other banks [8], and the effect of the liquidity of 
assets on a knock-on default [7]. These are abstract models, and not founded solidly 
on the observed structural properties of real bank credit networks. Hence, the models 
do not provide supervisors and other relevant authorities with any concrete 
information to aid them in standardizing the best practice as regulatory policies. On 
the other hand, some recent works include the studies on the detailed process where a 
bank go bankrupt [4], on the structural properties of the funds transfer between banks 
[11], and on the business loans from banks to companies [12]. It is, therefore, a 
technical issue to incorporate the knowledge which is learned from these works in the 
computer simulation models. 
In this study, a computer simulation model is developed to analyze the risk of 
insolvency of banks and the consequent knock-on defaults in a bank credit network. 
In the model, the topology of a bank credit network represents interbank loans, two 
quantities represent the assets in the balance sheet of individual banks, and three 
quantities represent the liabilities. This study does not address the liquidity risk but 
the risk of insolvency. The model does not include any roles of clearing houses either. 
Simulation experiments with the model quantify the worst impact which is imposed 
on the number of bank defaults, as a final outcome of the knock-on default, by 
heterogeneity of the bank credit network, the equity capital ratio of banks, and the 
capital surcharge on big banks. 
2  Model 
2.1  Balance sheet 
An interbank loan is the credit relation between a creditor bank and a debtor bank 
which appears when the debtor bank raises money in the interbank market. A bank 
credit network describes the all credit relations. It is a directed graph which consists 
of banks as vertices, and the loans as edges from creditor banks to debtor banks. The 
amount of the interbank loan and interbank borrowing of individual banks is 
determined consistently by the given topology of the bank credit network [1]. The 
balance sheet of individual banks is determined as follows. The balance sheet 
represents the financial state of a bank at a moment. Figure 1 shows the model for the 
balance sheet of a bank. 
Ai is the asset of the i-th bank (i = 1, …, N). The number of banks in the bank credit 
network is N. Ai consists of an external asset Ei and interbank loans Ii. Ii is the 
interbank borrowings of other banks. Ai=Ei+Ii holds. The external asset is an 
investment in general, for example, financing to companies and investing in securities. 
It is assumed in this study that the price of the external asset does not change and that 
the insolvency of a debtor bank for the interbank borrowing causes distress to the 
creditor bank and may ignite a knock-on default from the debtor bank. 
 Fig. 1. Interbank borrowing of a debtor bank from a creditor bank, and the resulting balance 
sheet of the two banks. 
Li is the liability of the i-th bank. Li consists of the net worth Ci, the interbank 
borrowing Bi, and the customer deposits Di. Bi is the interbank loans of other banks. 
The net worth means the equity capital which represents the core tier 1 capital 
including common stock and disclosed reserves. These need not be paid off, and can 
be used to absorb the loss from the distress immediately. Li=Ai and Li=Ci+Bi+Di hold. 
Four out of these five quantities are independent variables. 
Two constants Q and R describe the characteristics of the bank credit network. The 
constant Q is the total interbank loans I=Σ Ii as a fraction of the total assets A=Σ Ai. 
Give the amount of the total external assets E=Σ Ei, Equation (1) holds. 
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The constant R is the equity capital ratio of banks. The equity capital ratio of 
individual bank is defined by Equation (2). 
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It is assumed in this study that both big banks and small banks have the same value 
of R. The value of R is the minimal level of the equity capital ratio that is required by 
the bank regulatory policies. 
The balance sheet of individual banks is determined consistently, given the 
topology of the bank credit network, and the constants Q and R. A matrix l represents 
the topology. If the j-th bank borrows money from the i-th bank, lij=1, and lij=0 
otherwise. In general, lij= lji does not hold. The number of the debtor banks which 
borrow from the i-th bank is gi. This is the number of outgoing edges of the vertex. 
The number of the creditor banks from which the i-th bank borrows is ci. This is the 
number of incoming edges. These are called nodal degrees. The number of edges as a 
fraction of the number of the pairs between banks is p. In other words, it is the 
number of elements in l whose value is lij=1 as a fraction of N(N-1) . The average of 
the nodal degrees satisfies Equation (3). 
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The amount of the interbank borrowing of the j-th bank from the i-th bank is wij 
given by Equation (4). 
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The value of these two powers, s and t, characterize the heterogeneity in the 
amount of the loans. As the value of the powers increases, larger fraction of loans is 
owned by big banks which usually have large nodal degrees. The heterogeneity of the 
interbank loans emerges. If s=0 and t=0, the amount of loans is the same among any 
pairs of banks. This was the assumption made in most of the previous studies. 
The amount of the interbank loan and interbank borrowing is the sum of wij, and is 
given by Equations (5) and (6). 
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A prerequisite Ei > Bi-Ii is imposed on the balance sheet of individual banks. That 
is, the external asset is no less than the net interbank borrowing. Otherwise, those 
banks have already gone bankrupt. Ei is given by Equation (7). 
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The prerequisite is satisfied because of the first term on the right side of Equation 
(7). The second term, which is the same among banks, is added to the first term. The 
values of Ai, Li, Ci, and Di are determined from these values of Ii, Bi, and Ei. 
2.2  Default condition 
Given the balance sheet of banks, a simulation experiment reproduces a knock-on 
default which ensues from the bankruptcy of a particular bank. The distress whose 
strength is Si = Ei strikes an arbitrarily chosen bank initially. If the equity capital can 
absorb the distress (Ci > Si), the bank does not go bankrupt, nor the distress transmit. 
Otherwise, the i-th bank goes bankrupt. The distress transmits to the creditor banks 
from which the i-th bank borrows. The strength of the distress which is transmitted 
from the i-th bank (which went bankrupt) to the j-th bank (which is a creditor) is 
given by Equation (8). 
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If the equity capital can absorb the distress (Cj > Sj), the j-th bank does not go 
bankrupt. Otherwise, a knock-on default occurs, and the distress transmits to k-th 
bank further. The distress may transmit from multiple banks which go bankrupt to a 
bank from which those banks borrow. The sum of the distress strikes the bank in this 
case. The number of bank defaults Nd is the number of defaults in the knock-on 
default plus one (the initial bankruptcy). Given Q and p, the distribution of Nd(R) is 
investigated as a function of the equity capital ratio R for randomly synthesized 
100,000 different topologies of bank credit networks. 
Note that this study does not address the liquidity risk that selling assets in the 
market makes a big loss immediately after some banks go bankrupt, but the risk of the 
insolvency of a bank for an interbank borrowing because of the shortfall in the capital. 
The above model does not include any roles of clearing houses either. The clearing 
houses may reduce the settlement risk by netting loans and borrowings. Netting has 
the effect similar to delivery-versus-payment transactions like the simultaneous 
exchange of the title to an asset and payment. 
2.3  Network topology 
Two categories of the topologies l of bank credit networks are investigated in this 
study. Figure 2 shows an example of homogeneous bank credit networks when N=500, 
as a practical number of banks which operates internationally, and p=0.005. The 
topology is Erdos-Renyi model [14]. In graph theory, the Erdos-Renyi model is a 
random graph which sets an edge between every pair of vertices with equal 
probability p, independently of the other edges. The distribution of the nodal degree g 
is binomial, P(g) = N-1Cg p
g
 (1-p)
N-1-g
. The value of powers are s=0 and t=0. The size 
of vertices indicates the amount of the asset of banks, and the thickness of edges 
indicates the amount of loans. Banks are homogeneous in the amount of assets and 
loans. 
Figure 3 shows an example of heterogeneous bank credit networks when N=500 
and p=0.005. The topology is Barabasi-Albert model [13]. The Barabasi-Albert model 
is a random graph with the mechanism of growth and preferential attachment, which 
becomes scale-free as the number of vertices N goes to infinity, that is, the 
distribution of the nodal degree g obeys the power law, P(g) = g
-a
. There is a 
significant probability of the presence of very big vertices. This is the origin of 
heterogeneity. Natural and human-made systems, including the Internet, citation 
networks, and social networks are known scale-free. The value of powers are s=2 and 
t=2. Big banks are much bigger than small banks. 
The characteristics of the bank credit network are studied from the data on the 
funds transfer by Fedwire [11]. Fedwire is an on-line real-time gross settlement funds 
transfer system in the United States. It is run by Federal Reserve Banks. The 
characteristics found from the Fedwire data are summarized below. 
 Fig. 2. Homegeneous bank credit network when N=500 and p=0.005. 
 
Fig. 3. Heterogeneous bank credit network when N=500 and p=0.005. 
 
 The network consists of 6,600 commercial banks as vertices, 70,000 edges 
between them, and a clique of 25 big banks as a core sub-structure. The clique 
is a sub-network where every vertex has edges to the rest. 
 Banks are heterogeneous in their size. A few big banks transfer funds to more 
than 1,000 destination banks while a number of small banks transfer funds 
merely to a few destination banks. 
 The number of pairs of banks where funds are transferred is smaller than 
0.5% of the number of possible pairs of banks. 
 The distribution of the nodal degree of vertices g and c obeys the power law, 
P(g) = g
-2
 and P(c) = c
-2
 . The amount of funds transferred along an edge 
increases as the nodal degree at its ends increases. 
 There are significant amount of funds which are transferred between big 
banks and small banks. 
 The amount of funds transferred from a bank to a destination bank increases 
as the number of destination banks to which the bank transfers funds 
increases. Just 1% of banks transfer funds as much as 75% of the total funds. 
 
The characteristics of the network in Figure 3 are nearly equal to those of Fedwire. 
3  Default risk 
3.2  Number of defaults 
Figure 4 shows the number of defaults Nd(R) in a knock-on default as a function of 
the equity capital ratio R for homogeneous bank credit networks when N=500, Q=0.1, 
p=0.005. The curves in the figure show the 99th percentile, the 95th percentile, the 
90th percentile, the mean, and the mean plus one standard deviation. The 99th 
percentile point represents the worst case. The shape of these curves is similar. The 
number of defaults decreases largely as R increases. The knock-on default disappears 
when R > 0.05. The mean does not change much at Nd=3 when 0.02 < R < 0.04. 
Under this condition, the knock-on default transmits to the neighbor banks (the first 
hop banks) of the bank which went bankrupt initially, but not to the second hop banks 
of those first hop banks. The average number of the neighbor banks is pN = 2.5. 
Figure 5 shows Nd(R) as a function of R for heterogeneous bank credit networks 
when N=500, Q=0.1, p=0.005. The shapes of the curves are different between figures 
4 and 5. The effect of increasing the equity capital ratio is much smaller in Figure 5 
than that in Figure 4 while Nd still decreases as R increases. When R is relatively large, 
the effect of increasing the equity capital ratio diminishes. For example, the number 
of defaults at the 99-th percentile does not decrease much even as R becomes larger 
than 0.07. The equity capital ratio of R > 0.15 is necessary to contain the knock-on 
default perfectly. The gap between the curves of the 99th percentile and 95th 
percentile is large. It means that infrequent but catastrophic crisis may happen. This is 
a warning that a knock-on default may cause a loss which is significantly larger that 
that predicted from the mean in a real bank credit network like Fedwire. 
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Fig. 4. Number of defaults Nd (R) as a function of the equity capital ratio R for homogeneous 
bank credit networks when N=500, Q=0.1, and p=0.005. 
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Fig. 5. Number of defaults Nd(R) as a function of the equity capital ratio R for heterogeneous 
bank credit networks when N=500, Q=0.1, and p=0.005. 
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Fig. 6. Number of defaults Nd (R) as a function of the equity capital ratio R for homogeneous 
bank credit networks when N=500, Q=0.1, and p=0.05. 
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Fig. 7. Number of defaults Nd(R) as a function of the equity capital ratio R for heterogeneous 
bank credit networks when N=500, Q=0.1, and p=0.05. 
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Fig. 8. Number of defaults Nd (R) as a function of the equity capital ratio R for homogeneous 
bank credit networks when N=500, Q=0.2, and p=0.005. 
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Fig. 9. Number of defaults Nd(R) as a function of the equity capital ratio R for heterogeneous 
bank credit networks when N=500, Q=0.2, and p=0.005. 
 
Figure 6 shows the number of defaults Nd(R) for homogeneous bank credit 
networks when N=500, Q=0.1, p=0.05. Figure 7 shows Nd(R) for heterogeneous bank 
credit networks. Knock-on defaults disappear when R > 0.005 for homogeneous bank 
credit networks and R > 0.03 for heterogeneous bank credit networks. Dense bank 
credit networks are more robust. Figure 8 shows the number of defaults Nd(R) for 
homogeneous bank credit networks when N=500, Q=0.2, p=0.005. Figure 9 shows 
Nd(R) for heterogeneous bank credit networks. Knock-on defaults disappear when R > 
0.1 for homogeneous bank credit networks, but they still appear even when R > 0.2 
for heterogeneous bank credit networks. As the total interbank loans increases, the 
bank credit networks become less robust. 
3.2  Effect of surcharge 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision formulates the standard of the best 
practice of bank supervision as bank regulatory policies. The policies specify the 
minimal level of the amount of the equity capital for loss absorbency. The policies 
have been revised to improve the quality of the equity capital, and to enhance the risk 
coverage since the 2007 financial crisis. A consultative document2 set out the 
proposal from the Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision on the magnitude of additional loss absorbency of the global systemically 
important banks on July 19, 2011. The additional loss absorbency is called capital 
surcharge which is 1%, 1.5%, 2%, or 2.5% in the equity capital ratio. 
 
Fig. 10. Balance sheet of a big bank on which the additional equity capital ratio Rs is imposed. 
The effect of the capital surcharge on big banks on reducing the number of bank 
defaults is analyzed here. Figure 10 shows the balance sheet of a big bank on which 
the additional equity capital ratio Rs is imposed. The amount of the net worth becomes 
Ci+C’i where C’i is given by Equation (9). The amount of the asset becomes Ai+ C’i. 
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2 Bank for International Settlements, Global systemically important banks: Assessment 
methodology and the additional loss absorbency requirement, 
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs201.pdf. 
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Fig. 11. Number of defaults Nd(R) when the additional equity capital ratio Rs is imposed on 0%, 
10%, or 20% of the biggest banks in a homogeneous bank credit network. N=500, Q=0.1, and 
p=0.005. 
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Fig. 12. Number of defaults Nd(R) when the additional equity capital ratio Rs is imposed on 0%, 
10%, or 20% of the biggest banks in a heterogeneous bank credit network. N=500, Q=0.1, and 
p=0.005. 
 
Figure 11 shows the number of defaults Nd(R) when the additional equity capital 
ratio Rs=0.025 is imposed on 0%, 10% (50 banks out of N=500), or 20% (100 banks) 
of the biggest banks in a homogeneous bank credit network. The capital surcharge 
reduces the number of defaults. The effect is stronger if the equity capital ratio is 
smaller. Figure 12 shows Nd(R) when the additional equity capital ratio Rs is imposed 
in a heterogeneous bank credit network. The effect of the capital surcharge is not so 
evident in heterogeneous networks than in homogeneous networks. 
No doubt that the capital surcharge strengthens the loss absorbency of individual 
banks. It reduces the risk that the individual banks go bankrupt, and the burden on tax 
payers to bail out the banks which are too big to fail. But real bank credit networks 
like Fedwire are heterogeneous. The capital surcharge may not alleviate the 
transmission of distress, nor eradicate knock-on defaults. It should not be relied on too 
heavily to restore the stability of the financial system. 
4  Conclusion 
One of the lessons of the 2007 financial crisis is that supervisors and other relevant 
authorities failed to sense the risk hidden in the complexity of a heterogeneous bank 
credit network just by keeping a close eye on individual banks and economic 
fundamentals. The scope of the argument on the capital surcharge set out in the 
consultative document is still the resilience of individual global systemically 
important banks. This study, however, shows that the additional loss absorbency may 
not work as an efficient fire wall in keeping financial distress from transmitting 
worldwide completely. The very nature of heterogeneous bank credit networks is a 
serious hindrance in containing the transmission of distress. Strengthening big banks 
alone may not solve the problem in restoring the stability of the bank credit network. 
The computer simulation models will be extended to address more practical 
circumstances. Under these, the models will include settlement dates (overnight, 
short-term, or long-term) of loans, netting of loans, refinancing and other means to 
raise money, and liquidity of assets and other market mechanisms. Another issue of 
the models is that the topology of many real bank credit networks is not static, and 
can not be observed directly either. In the field of social network analysis, the 
presence or absence of an edge between two persons as vertices is inferred from the 
observation on their behavior with a statistical analysis [9]. An edge between two 
populations can also be inferred [3]. Impending phenomena may be predicted from 
the inferred topology. Similarly, the stability of the financial system may be predicted 
from both the observed behavior of individual banks and the inferred topology of the 
bank credit network. This aids the supervisors and other relevant authorities in 
designing the financial system theoretically, and in making regulatory policies in 
practice. These are the goal of the emerging field of systems socio-economics. 
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